Red Cliffs Corner, L.L.C. v. J.J. Hunan, Inc. dba J.J. Hunan Sum Fun Food, and R. Alan Knox : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Red Cliffs Corner, L.L.C. v. J.J. Hunan, Inc. dba J.J.
Hunan Sum Fun Food, and R. Alan Knox : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell S. Mitchell; Jones Waldo Holbrook and McDonough, P.C.; Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.
Russell S. Walker, David R. Williams; Woodbury and Kesler, P.C.; Attorney for Defendants,
Appellants, and Cross-Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Red Cliffs Corner, L.L.C. v. J.J. Hunan, Inc., No. 20070846 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/516
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RED CLIFFS CORNER, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-
Appellant, 
vs. 
J.J. HUNAN, INC. dba J.J. HUNAN SUM 
FUN FOOD, and R. ALAN KNOX, 
Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-
Appellees. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20070846-CA o 
District Court Civil Case No. 050500538 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Washington Count, State of Utah, Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
Attorney for Defendants, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees 
Russell S. Walker 
David R. Williams 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3358 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant 
Russell S. Mitchell 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
{Oral Argument Requested) 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 2 4 2008 
RED CLIFFS CORNER, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-
Appellant, 
vs. 
J J. HUNAN, INC. dba J.J. HUNAN SUM 
FUN FOOD, and R. ALAN KNOX, 
Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-
Appellees. 
Attorney for Defendants, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees 
Russell S. Walker 
David R. Williams 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3358 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20070846-CA 
District Court Civil Case No. 050500538 
Attorneys for Plaintiff', Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant 
Russell S. Mitchell 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Washington Count, State of Utah, Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED RCC S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 1 
II. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL WHERE 
THE THIRTY-DAY NOTICE OF APPEAL PERIOD APPLIES 5 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RCC 
PROPERLY TERMINATED THE LEASE WHERE HUNAN WAS 
NEVER IN MATERIAL DEFAULT OF THE LEASE 6 
IV. WHERE HUNAN NEVER BREACHED THE TERMS OF THE LEASE 
WITH RCC IT WAS NOT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND WAS 
NEVERATENANT AT WILL 10 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING 
AGAINST HUNAN AND KNOX BASED ON THE EQUITABLE 
DOCTRINE OF WAIVER 11 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
HUNAN AND KNOX'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS 
COUNTERCLAIM 13 
CONCLUSION 19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 20 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv. 2002 UT 73, 47 P.3d 92 1 
Berkshires. L.L.C. v. Svkes. 2005 UT App 536, 127 P.3d 1243 16, 17 
Brandlev v. Lewis. 92 P.2d 338 (Utah 1939) 5,6 
Buckner v. Kennard. 2004 UT 78 99, P.3d 842 11 
Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82. 100 P.3d 1177 11 
Fashions Four Corp. v. Fashion Place Associates, 691 P.2d 831 (Utah 1984) 6 
Fullmer v. Blood. 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976) 2, 3, 4 
InreEstateofBartell. 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) 11 
Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 572 11 
Travner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984) 26 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 (l)(c) 4, 36, 37 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-811 4 
Rules 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) 3, 17, 20, 21 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(d) 4, 15, 41 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) 4, 15, 41 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellants JJ. Hunan, Inc. ("Hunan") and Alan Knox ("Knox") hereby 
incorporate the statement of issues presented for appeal as set forth in their opening brief. 
In addition to those issues, the following issue has been raised by Appellee Red Cliffs 
Corner, L.L.C. ("RCC") in its cross-appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to award RCC its request for 
attorneys' fees where Hunan and Knox were forced to forfeit $58,405.36 in landlord 
improvements which RCC failed to complete. 
The question of whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of 
law that an appellate court reviews for correctness. A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Guv, 2002 UT App 73 ^ 7, 47 P.3d 92. Hunan and Knox do not dispute that 
RCC properly preserved this issue below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED RCC'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
RCC challenges the trial court's denial of its request for its attorneys' fees as 
incorrect. RCC is mistaken. Although a court "may award reasonable attorney fees in 
accordance with the terms of the parties' agreement," Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 
858 (Utah 1984), "courts have, in extraordinary circumstances, declined to award attorney 
fees to a prevailing party in spite of an enforceable contract provision." A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT 73 at f^ 7. The case at hand presents just 
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such "extraordinary circumstances" where Hunan and Knox were forced to forfeit the 
$58,405.36 in tenant improvements they made without being reimbursed by RCC. 
In Fullmer v. Blood. 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
a trial court's denial of a prevailing party's request for attorneys' fees in spite of an 
enforceable contractual provision. The plaintiffs had brought an action to quiet title to 
real property and to declare forfeiture of $12,150 paid by the defendant under a uniform 
real estate contract. Id. at 607. The contract at issue "provided that in case of default the 
defaulting party shall pay costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee 
incurred in enforcing the agreement, or in pursuing any remedy with respect to the 
property." Id. at 610. While the trial court ultimately held that there had been a 
forfeiture, it denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. Id. 
On appeal, the Fullmer court affirmed the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees, 
and in so doing held, 
[D]ue to the somewhat complicated fact situation in this case, it does not seem to 
be an unwarranted assumption that both parties thought they had some justification 
for making their respective claims to the property, which dispute could best be 
resolved by obtaining an adjudication of their rights therein. A suit of this nature 
involving the invocation of a forfeiture and/or the enforcement of a purchase 
contract invokes consideration of the principles of equity which address 
themselves to the conscience and discretion of the trial court. In addition to other 
considerations, there is the fact that the plaintiffs had received $12,150 which is 
forfeited and not recoverable to the defendant. In view of these circumstances we 
are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to require 
defendant to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 
Id. 
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As in Fullmer, Hunan and Knox were justified in claiming that RCC's refusal to 
reimburse them for the $58,405.36 of landlord improvements was a material breach of the 
parties' Lease Agreement. (R. 26, 525; Trial Trans. 245). As in Fullmer, the trial court 
invoked the equitable doctrine of waiver to find that Hunan and Knox waived RCC's 
breach as well as any claim to reimbursement of the $58,405.36. (R. 368-363.) And as in 
Fullmer, RCC was the beneficiary of the $58,405.36 in improvements which the trial 
court ordered forfeited and which was unrecoverable by Hunan and Knox. (Id.) The 
combination of these unique circumstances, as in Fullmer, supports the trial court's denial 
of RCC's attorneys' fees. 
RCC, however, argues that the trial court incorrectly denied its request for 
attorneys' fees because no "extraordinary circumstances" justified its denial. RCC also 
cites to Fullmer and contends that since it prevailed on its claims against Hunan and 
Knox, there are no "extraordinary circumstances" which would justify the denial of its 
request for attorneys' fees. (Appellee's Op. Br. at 44.) RCC's argument misconstrues the 
foundation of the Fullmer holding. 
While the Fullmer court noted that it was "significant" that the trial court had 
found against the plaintiffs on one of the main issues of the case, that factor was not the 
sine qua non of the court's analysis. Rather, as cited above, the Utah Supreme Court 
looked to other factors such as: whether the defendant was justified in making a claim to 
the property, that principles of equity had been invoked by the trial court, and that the 
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plaintiffs received a $12,150 windfall by virtue of the defendant's forfeiture. Fullmer. 
546 P.2d at 610. Accordingly, the bare fact that RCC prevailed on its claims at trial did 
not preclude the trial court from denying RCC its request for fees. 
The trial court's denial of RCC s request for attorneys' fees is in harmony with 
Fullmer. In its Order Denying Plaintiffs Rule 52 Motion to Amend, the trial court noted 
that it "ultimately found defendants were legally barred from recovering on their tenant 
improvements." (R. at 402.) As in Fullmer, where the defendant was denied $12,500, 
Hunan and Knox were prohibited from receiving any compensation for the $58,405.36 
they spent to improve RCC's property. Those improvements proved to be a windfall for 
RCC, who paid nothing for them and who enjoys them to this day. (R. 192.) 
A trial court may properly deny a prevailing party's request for attorneys' fees if, 
in its sound discretion, the court concludes that the circumstances of the case warrant 
such a denial. As set forth above, the facts of this case present the kind of "extraordinary 
circumstances" which support the trial court's denial of RCC's attorneys' fees request. 
Taking into careful consideration the merits of Hunan and Knox's claims, the principles 
of equity invoked by both parties, and the windfall which RCC received at the expense of 
Hunan and Knox, the trial court did not incorrectly deny RCC's request for attorneys' 
fees. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of RCC's Rule 52 Motion to Amend should be 
affirmed. 
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IL THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL WHERE 
THE THIRTY-DAY NOTICE OF APPEAL PERIOD APPLIES 
This case falls under the purview of the thirty-day notice of appeal period where it 
does not solely involve a claim for unlawfiil detainer. RCC argues that this case does not 
involve any other claims other than one for unlawful detainer and therefore the ten-day 
notice of appeal period applies. Additionally, RCC states that this case is subject to the 
shorter notice of appeal period because there are no equitable claims or claims for 
declaratory relief. (Appellee's Op. Br. at 19-22.) This argument ignores the facts of this 
case and should be rejected. 
From the outset of this case, it involved more than just a claim for unlawful 
detainer and breach of the Lease. Unlike Brandley v. Lewis, 92 P.2d 338 (Utah 1939), 
Hunan and Knox asserted a counterclaim against RCC and RCC initiated a claim against 
Knox to enforce Knox's personal guarantee. (R. 1-6.) Furthermore, the conversion claim 
alleged by Hunan and Knox in their Amended Complaint and Counterclaim further 
illustrates the hybrid nature of this case. (R. 164.) 
The inclusion of the conversion claim evidences that the case was not just about 
unlawful detainer or even a breach of the Lease, but rather encompassed other claims 
including the enforcement of a personal guarantee and a claim for conversion. However, 
even if this Court bundles these additional claims with that for unlawful detainer, this 
case does involve additional equitable claims which subject the case to the thirty-day 
appeal period. 
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A case may be removed from the "unlawful detainer" category and its attendant 
ten day appeal period if equitable claims are present. See Gordon Case & Co. v. West 
2005 UT App 304, fflf 7-11, 117 P.3d 1070. In this case, Hunan and Knox raised 
equitable claims from the outset when they asserted equitable defenses including 
estoppel, waiver, and laches in their Answer and Counterclaim. (R. at 25.) Moreover, the 
trial court ruled against Hunan and Knox based on the equitable doctrine of wavier, 
thereby underscoring the equitable claims and nature of this case. (R. 368-374.) 
Accordingly, this case is unlike Brandley which presented a "straight typical unlawful 
detainer complaint," Brandley, 92 P.2d at 339, and more analogous to the hybrid case 
presented in Fashions Four Corp. v. Fashion Place Associates, 691 P.2d 831 (Utah 1984). 
RCC attempts to repaint the landscape of this case by asserting that it is, like 
Brandley, solely one about unlawful detainer. This blanket characterization ignores 
RCC's own claim against Knox along with the equitable claims raised by Hunan and 
Knox as well as the trial court's ultimate equitable determination. Moreover, Hunan and 
Knox's conversation claim illustrates the hybrid nature of this case and supports Hunan 
and Knox's contention that the thirty-day notice of appeal period applies. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RCC PROPERLY 
TERMINATED THE LEASE WHERE HUNAN WAS NEVER IN 
MATERIAL DEFAULT OF THE LEASE 
The Lease's plain language does not support the trial court's ruling that RCC 
properly terminated the Lease with Hunan. The operative inquiry for purposes of this 
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issue is what meaning should be given to the Lease's Material Default and Breach 
Provision which provides, 
Tenant shall be in material default and breach under this Lease if (I) Tenant shall 
default in the payment as and when due of any Minimum Rent, Additional Rent or 
any other amount required to be paid by Tenant hereunder, and such default shall 
continue for a period often (10) days after written notice thereof from Landlord. 
(Appellants' Op. Br. Add. Exh. 1 at 32-33.) 
As set forth in their opening brief, Hunan and Knox contend that this language 
defines a "material default and breach" as occurring only if Hunan refused to pay its rent 
for ten days after receiving a written notice from RCC. If no written notice or the 
opportunity to cure is provided, even if Hunan is late with its rent, that does not constitute 
a breach of the Lease let alone a material default and breach. 
In its opening brief, RCC does not dispute that it failed to send Hunan written 
notification of Hunan's late rent and a ten-day opportunity to cure. Rather, RCC relies on 
a tortured reading of the Lease which pretends the written notice and opportunity to cure 
language never existed. While all the parties may agree that the Lease provides a written 
notice and opportunity to cure requirement, only Hunan and Knox's interpretation of the 
Lease gives credence to this language. 
RCC argues that the "Cure Period and the Default Notice have nothing to do with 
RCC's termination of Hunan's tenancy or with the issues on appeal." (Appellee's Op. Br. 
at 26.) Nothing could be further from the truth. The Lease is clear that a material default 
and breach only occur if Hunan withheld its rent after receiving a written notice and ten 
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days to cure. Where no notice or opportunity were provided, then a material default and 
breach did not occur. RCC's interpretation of the Lease renders the notice and cure 
provision optional; an exercise to be enforced on its own whim. RCC even goes so far as 
to say that to give notice and the opportunity to cure would have been a "meaningless 
gesture" since Hunan did paid its rent along with the requisite late fees. (Appellee's Op. 
Br. at 29.) However, the fact that Hunan ultimately paid its rent does not relieve RCC of 
the obligation to send the written notice to begin with. 
The language of the Lease regarding what constitutes a material breach and default 
is clear: a failure to pay rent for a period often days after written notice from RCC. 
Where RCC never provided written notice, Hunan could not have materially breached the 
Lease for late rent alone. Had the Lease simply provided for a material breach and 
default upon the failure to pay rent, then RCC's argument would be more tenable. 
However, the Lease's language requires such written notice and RCC undisputedly failed 
to provide that. Accordingly, Hunan did not materially breach the Lease and was not in 
default and RCC should not have terminated the Lease. 
RCC also argues that the Lease's Termination Provision is not premised on RCC 
providing written notice and the opportunity to cure with each of the three consecutive 
defaults. (Appellee's Op. Br. at 28-29.) The Termination Provision permits RCC's 
termination of the Lease once Hunan defaulted in its rent obligation for three consecutive 
months, then followed by a late payment in one additional month. RCC's argument, 
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however, is again based on its erroneous assertion that written notice and the opportunity 
to cure is optional. 
RCC contends that once Hunan failed to pay rent on time for three consecutive 
months, regardless of whether notice and time to cure was provided, RCC was permitted 
to terminate Hunan's lease. While it is true that Hunan was late with its rent for three 
consecutive months, those late payments do not classify as a default under the Lease let 
alone rise to a material default and breach where no written notice and cure opportunity 
were provided. The Termination Provision provides RCC with protection in the event 
Hunan were to habitually default i.e., failed to pay its rent even after receiving notice, in 
the payment of its rent. However, Hunan's late rent payments do not classify as defaults 
since they were never accompanied with RCC's written notice and opportunity to cure. 
Moreover, the Termination Provision contemplates the notice and opportunity to cure 
requirement where its language references those provisions and Hunan's opportunity to 
cure late payments. (Add. Exh. 1. at 36.) 
The Lease is unambiguous in classifying a late rent payment as a default and 
breach only if Hunan did so after receiving written notice of the delinquency and the 
opportunity to cure. As hard as RCC may try, this language is clear and unescapable. For 
the reasons set forth above, along with those set forth in the Appellants' opening brief, the 
trial court's interpretation of the Lease should be rejected. 
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IV. WHERE HUNAN NEVER BREACHED THE TERMS OF THE LEASE 
WITH RCC IT WAS NOT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND WAS NEVER 
A TENANT AT WILL 
As RCC and Knox argued in their opening brief, Hunan did not unlawfully detain 
the Premises. However, even if Hunan was in unlawful detainer, RCC failed to comply 
with the notice and cure provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(l)(c)1, and therefore 
improperly evicted Hunan. 
In its opening brief, RCC argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802(l)(b)(ii), 
which tellingly contains no notice or cure provision, applies in this case. RCC argues that 
this statute is controlling because it deals with tenancies at will. (Appellee's Op. Br. at 
30-31.) RCC's argument is premised on the assumption that Hunan was in fact a tenant 
at will based on its alleged breach of the Lease. For the reasons set forth above, as well 
as those advanced in Hunan and Knox's opening brief, Hunan was not a tenant at will and 
therefore § 78-36-3(1 )(c) is the applicable statute in this case. As such, it is undisputed 
that RCC failed to provide written notice and the three day opportunity to cure called for 
by the statute. By failing to comply with the statute's clear written notice and opportunity 
to cure requirement, RCC's eviction of Hunan was improper and the trial court should be 
reversed. 
1
 This section has been recodified as U.C.A. § 78B-6-802. 
10 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING AGAINST 
HUNAN AND KNOX BASED ON THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF 
WAIVER 
The clear weight of facts in this case demonstrate that neither Hunan nor Knox 
waived their claim that RCC breached the Lease by failing to complete the Landlord's 
Work. Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion in invoking the equitable doctrine of 
waiver on RCC's behalf where RCC lacked the requisite clean hands. 
RCC does not address Hunan and Knox's argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding the equitable remedy of waiver to a party without clean hands. As 
Hunan and Knox have previously asserted, Utah courts are clear that to seek equity, a 
party must do so with clean hands. See Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ^ f 99, 57 P.3d 
842; Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, % 21, 982 P.2d 572. Accordingly, for the reasons 
set forth in their opening brief, Hunan and Knox ask the Court to reverse the trial court's 
ruling that Hunan and Knox waived their claims against RCC where RCC lacked the 
clean hands necessary to benefit from that remedy. 
The equitable doctrine of waiver does present mixed questions of law and fact. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1f 23, 100 P.3d 1177. The question of whether the proper 
standard of wavier was applied presents a legal question which is reviewed for 
correctness, while "the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature 
and should be reviewed as factual determinations." Id. A trial court's findings of fact 
will only be set aside where "[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
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findings and then demonstrate that despite the evidence, the trial court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence." Id. at ^ 19 quoting In re 
Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Hunan and Knox have not challenged the first two elements of waiver, but have 
challenged the trial court's legal conclusion that Hunan and Knox intended to relinquish 
its right to pursue a claim against RCC for breach of the Lease. (R. 370-373.) The trial 
court's conclusion of law set forth the facts it relied upon in coming to its legal 
conclusion. Based on the nature of the equitable remedy, the application of the legal 
standard for determining whether this third element was satisfied, Hunan and Knox 
contend that the marshaling requirement did not attach. However, even if it did, Hunan 
and Knox did marshal the evidence by citing to each fact that supported the trial court's 
conclusion. 
In their opening brief, Hunan and Knox cite to the specific testimony presented at 
trial which supported the trial court's conclusion and findings of fact. (Appellants' Op. 
Br. at 24.) While Hunan and Knox did not cite to the specific factual finding in the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, their citation to the trial transcript and 
actual case record supplies this Court with the same evidence and facts relied upon by the 
trial court in reaching its conclusion. After citing to all of the evidence the trial court 
relied upon, Hunan and Knox then cited the facts supporting their position that they did 
not waive their claim against RCC. (Id. at 24-26.) 
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Hunan and Knox's citation to all of the facts the trial court relied upon in making 
its legal conclusion satisfies the marshaling requirement. Furthermore, Hunan and Knox 
contend that the marshaling requirement does not apply to this case where Hunan and 
Knox are challenging the application of the proper standard of waiver, which does not 
carry with it the marshaling requirement. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HUNAN 
AND KNOX'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS COUNTERCLAIM 
The trial court's denial of Hunan and Knox's Motion to Amend was an abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed. Hunan and Knox filed their Motion to Amend prior to 
the deadline for amending pleadings as established by the court's scheduling order. (R. 
136.) However, the trial court denied Hunan and Knox's Motion to Amend, in part, 
because the court believed Hunan and Knox had waited too long to file a Request to 
Submit for Decision. As set forth in their opening brief, this ruling was erroneous and 
contrary to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(d). 
The trial court set forth seven different reasons for denying Hunan and Knox's 
Motion to Amend. (R. 255-258.) Two of these reasons, the second and seventh, are 
based on the court's erroneous conclusion that Hunan and Knox waited too long to file a 
Request to Submit on their Motion to Amend. (R. 255-257.) The remaining five 
conclusions are: 
1. Hunan and Knox failed to set forth with any particularity the grounds for 
their Motion to Amend to be granted; 
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2. Hunan and Knox did not file a reply memorandum in support of their 
Motion to Amend and failed to show any discovery being done that would 
be consistent with the amended claims they sought; 
3. At oral argument, Hunan and Knox did not provide the court with a reason 
for why they had waited to file their Request to Submit but argued that their 
Motion should be considered one akin to a Motion to Amend to conform 
the pleadings to the evidence at trial; 
4. Hunan and Knox's counsel attempted to specify several specific facts to 
support the Motion to Amend that were not supported by affidavit or 
credible documents; and 
5. The claims Hunan and Knox asserted in their proposed Amended Complaint 
were not based on newly discovered facts brought out through the discovery 
process. 
(R. 255-257.) For the following reasons, each of these conclusions was erroneous. 
First, the trial court's assertion that Hunan and Knox's Motion to Amend failed to 
set forth with particularity the grounds for granting it is belied by the Motion to Amend 
itself. 
In the Motion to Amend, Hunan and Knox incorporated their Amended 
Counterclaim which sets forth with particularity the basis of their conversion and breach 
of the Lease claims. Rather than restating all of those factual allegations and legal 
arguments in the Motion to Amend itself, Hunan and Knox avoided such redundancy by 
attaching their Amended Counterclaim to the Motion to Amend and then referencing the 
Amended Counterclaim. Accordingly, Hunan and Knox did set forth with particularity 
the basis for granting their Motion to Amend and the trial court ruled incorrectly. 
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Second, the fact that Hunan and Knox chose to not file a reply brief in support of 
their Motion to Amend is not fatal to their Motion and discovery was unnecessary to 
support their Amended Counterclaim. 
The trial court noted that "although a Memorandum in Opposition to their Motion 
was timely filed, Defendants did not file any reply memorandum contradicting the case 
law brought out by Plaintiff that the failure to set forth particular grounds for relief is fatal 
to their Motion." (R. at 255.) However, a reply memorandum is not a mandatory filing 
and the failure to file this optional memorandum should not have been fatal to Hunan and 
Knox's Motion to Amend. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(1) provides that "[w]ithin five days after service 
of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party may file a reply memorandum." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (2008)(emphasis added). The inclusion of the word "may" signals 
that a reply memorandum is optional and not mandated by the Rule. Moreover, Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 7(d) provides that, "[t]he request to submit for decision shall state 
. . . the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d) (2008) 
(emphasis added). Rule 7(d), therefore, also recognizes the optional nature of the reply 
memorandum. Additionally, nothing in Rule 7(d) prohibits a moving party from filing a 
request to submit if a reply memorandum has not been filed. In short, the fact that Hunan 
and Knox chose not to file the optional reply memorandum does not preclude them from 
having their original Motion to Amend heard by the Court. 
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The trial court's conclusion that there had been no discovery to show any new 
facts or evidence that would require an amendment to the Answer and Counterclaim was 
also clearly erroneous. 
Hunan and Knox's Amended Counterclaim sought to include a claim for 
conversion based on RCC's refusal to turn over $100,000 worth of personal property to 
Hunan and Knox after it took possession of the Premises. (R. 160-163.) The basis for the 
conversion claim arose once RCC refused to return the personal property which Hunan 
and Knox had left on the Premises after being evicted. No discovery was needed to 
establish this claim. Hunan and Knox did not need to conduct depositions, document 
requests, requests for admission, or interrogatories to establish what they already knew: 
that RCC had taken their personal property and refused to return it. Consequently, no 
discovery was needed to mine for new facts to establish their conversion claim. 
Hunan and Knox did not include their conversion claim in their original Answer 
and Counterclaim because RCC had not yet converted their personal property. Once RCC 
took possession of the Premises in May of 2005 and refused to return the property to 
Hunan and Knox the conversion claim arose. (R. 191-192; 525; Trial Trans. 12.) 
Discovery would not have provided any new facts for Hunan and Knox in support of their 
claim. The trial court's insistence that new discovery support the conversion claim was 
unnecessary and erroneous. 
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Third, Hunan and Knox waited to file their Request to Submit because they were 
actively involved in negotiations with RCC to recover their property without litigation. 
However, as set forth in their opening brief, Hunan and Knox contend that the timing of 
their Request to Submit is irrelevant where neither Rule 7(d), nor any other Utah rule of 
civil procedure, renders a moving party's motion untimely when a request to submit is not 
filed by a certain date. Indeed, the operative inquiry is not when Hunan and Knox's 
Request to Submit was filed, but rather, when the original Motion to Amend was. 
In this case, the Motion to Amend was filed prior to the deadline for amending 
pleadings and the Motion should have been granted. Hunan and Knox's position is 
supported by Berkshires L.L.C. v. Svkes. 2005 UT App 536, 127 P.3d 1243, where the 
moving party filed its motion to amend after the close of discovery. Unlike the facts of 
Berkshires, however, Hunan and Knox filed their Motion to Amend prior to the 
amendment of pleadings deadline and the fact it waited to file its Request to Submit is 
immaterial. 
Fourth, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Amend on the 
grounds that oral statements introduced at the hearing on the Motion were not supported 
by affidavit. At the hearing, Russell S. Walker ("Walker"), attorney for Hunan and Knox, 
explained that the delay in filing the Request to Submit was due to ongoing negotiations 
he had been having with RCC's counsel to retrieve Hunan and Knox's personal property. 
Walker stated that once those negotiations had broken down, and the prospect for 
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retrieving the property outside of court vanished, Hunan and Knox filed the Request to 
Submit. 
Hunan and Knox assert that no affidavits were necessary in this case since the 
hearing on the Motion to Amend was not an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, an affidavit 
would have been unnecessary since Walker was the party familiar with the facts 
surrounding the Motion to Amend and Request to Submit. Since Walker was available 
and present at the hearing on the Motion to Amend, his affidavit was unnecessary since 
he could provide live testimony before the trial court about both his negotiations 
regarding the personal property and the status of the Motion to Amend and Request to 
Submit. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), which governs an affidavit signed by an 
attorney, provides that by signing a paper to the court, "an attorney . . . is certifying that to 
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances . . . the allegations and other factual contentions have 
evidentiary support." Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (2008). Had Walker filed an affidavit with 
the trial court in support of Hunan and Knox's Motion to Amend, it would not have 
varied at all from the live testimony he gave at the hearing. Additionally, Walker's 
statements were all based on his personal knowledge since he, not another party, had been 
the one negotiating with RCC to retrieve Hunan and Knox's personal property. Walker's 
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oral statements regarding the Motion to Amend and Request to Submit were appropriate 
and an affidavit was therefore unnecessary. 
Fifth, the trial court repeated its conclusion that the Amended Counterclaim was 
"not based on newly discovered facts brought out through the discovery process." (R. at 
256.) As explained above, discovery was unnecessary to bring to light the additional 
claim of conversion and breach of the Lease against RCC. Once RCC took Hunan and 
Knox's property and refused to return it the conversion claim arose, embarking on 
discovery would not have shed any additional light on that claim. The additional breach 
of the Lease claim was also not dependent on new discovery since it was based on the 
original breach of Lease claim set forth in the Answer and Counterclaim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Hunan and Knox respectfully ask this Court to reverse 
the trial court's Judgment. 
DATED this JJ— day of October, 2008. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C 
ILjeu£6— 
Russell S. Walker 
David R. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendants, Appellants, Cross-
Appellees 
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